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LEAD PAINT POISONING-MUNICIPAL,
STATE, AND FEDERAL APPROACHES
WILLIAM F. GREER, JR.*
About 200 children die from lead poisoning each year. Between
12,000 and 16,000 children are treated and survive. [Half of those
who receive treatment are left mentally retarded.] But it is be-
lieved that as many as 400,000 children may be poisoned each
year. Due to inadequate detection and diagnosis, the true count
of lead intoxication in our Nation's children is not known. Any
incidence of lead sickness is alarmingly high, because there is no
reason for lead poisoning to threaten our children's lives.
Lead poisoning ... is completely preventable ....
Lead paint poisoning results from young children eating quantities
of lead-based paint which has peeled from walls and other surfaces
of their home environment.2 Lead was used as a pigment in most
interior paints until approximately 1950 when the paint industry
replaced it with other compounds.3 The lethal nature of paints with
a lead base has become apparent as older housing has deteriorated.
The poisoning occurs in five to ten per cent of children between one
and six years old who live in deteriorated areas.4 Since poisoning
occurs usually in poor housing, it is largely an ailment of lower
* B.A., Miami University, 1970; J.D., Washington University, 1973.
1. Statement of Senator Edward Kennedy, Hearings on the Lead Paint Poi-
soning Prevention Act Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1970) [Hearings herein-
after cited as 1970 Hearings].
2. Medical aspects of lead paint poisoning are discussed in 1970 Hearings;
see especially Statement of Dr. Julian Chisolm, Jr., American Academy of Pediat-
rics, 1970 Hearings 203-15; DR. J. LIN-Fu, LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN (Pub-
lic Health Service, 1970), reproduced in 1970 Hearings at 321-47; Public Health
Service, Control of Lead Poisoning in Children (prepubl. draft, 1970) [Herein-
after cited as Control of Lead Poisoning in Children], reproduced in 1970 Hear-
ings at 51-174.
3. Statement of Harold Finger, Dep't. of HUD, Hearings on the Lead Based
Paint Poisoning Prevention Act Amendments of 1972 Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1972) [Hearings hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
4. Scientists' Institute for Public Information, A Call for Help, 10 SCIENTIST
& CITIZEN 49 (April 1968), reproduced in 1970 Hearing at 351.
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socio-economic groups.5 Preliminary analysis indicates that as many
as 7,000,000 housing units are deteriorated and contain surfaces
covered with lead paint, authorities estimate that 2,500,000 children
live in substandard housing where a potential lead hazard exists.0
Health and government officials are understandably frustrated by
the continuing existence of lead poisoning in children since the
method of prevention is known. Avoiding the illness is accomplished
by removing the dangerous paint and repainting or resurfacing the
unit. The apparent ease of solution, however, is deceptive.
Significant costs are involved in a lead poisoning prevention effort.
First, personnel must be committed to screening the populace to
identify those children with presently dangerous levels of lead in
their systems.7 Acute cases require hospitalization, and if retardation
occurs permanent institutionalization may be necessary." Second,
housing must be inspected to ascertain which units contain lead
paint. Prevention programs in large eastern cities have been proposed
with estimated annual budgets of as much as $3,000,000. In 1970-71
New York City continued the operation of its lead program with a
budget of $2,400,000.10
5. One doctor has said: "This is primarily a disease of the poor, the black,
the Spanish-speaking and other groups living in substandard housing. In New
York, for example, as many as 86 percent of the reported cases of lead poisoning
have occurred among black and Spanish-speakling persons although they make
up less than 50 percent of the population." Statement of Dr. Merlin DuVal,
Dep't. of HEW, 1972 Hearings 235.
6. 1972 Hearings 17.
7. Methods of screening children are discussed in DR. J. LiN-Fu, supra note 2,
1970 Hearings 331-33; Control of Lead Poisoning in Children, 1970 Hearings
94-106.
8. The cost of treatment has been estimated by Dr. Julian Chisholm, Jr. to
vary from $1,050 to $222,375, depending upon the severity of the poisoning.
Statement of Dr. Julian Chisholm, Jr., 1970 Hearings 213.
9. It was revealed that in Philadelphia it is estimated that "$3,000,000 would
be needed for the first year to screen 45,000 children with blood lead tests and
to inspect and test 50,000 dwelling units for lead hazards." Statement of the
Medical Committee for Human Rights, 1970 Hearings 276. Dr. Jonathan Fine
estimated that in Boston "an on-going program of education, identification and
remediation, both of the child and his environment, [would cost] approximately$1,400,000 per year ...for the first two or three years, after which the need
should diminish appreciably." Statement of Dr. Jonathan Fine, Boston Dep't. of
Health & Hospitals, 1970 Hearings 235.
10. Statement of Dr. Vincent Guinee, New York City Health Services Ad.
ministration, 1970 Hearings 282. The budget was based on a projection of test.
ing 100,000 children and finding 2,500 to have significant lead levels. The total
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When a structure containing dangerous amounts of lead paint is
discovered, the large cost of rehabilitating the unit must be allo-
Lated.27 Enforcement problems would arise if the burden of repair
were placed solely on the owner of a dwelling. An owner might
attempt to abandon his investment in a deteriorating building, rather
than expend money to abate a lead paint hazard. Similarly, the large
expense involved could prohibit many communities from pursuing
a rehabilitation program unless assistance were provided.12
The lead paint poisoning dilemma, therefore, has many facets.
This note will consider solutions to the problem through housing
code regulation by local governments, landlord-tenant innovations,
and federal legislation.
I. MUNICIPAL HOUSING CoDES
Several cities have passed ordinances dealing with lead paint poi-
soning,13 placing it in the broad context of governmental code en-
forcement.14 Municipal housing and health codes are a means of en-
couraging the maintenance of dwellings in an inhabitable condition.
budget was divided into screening and administrative components: finding and
testing children--$1,240,200 ($12.40 per child); testing dwelling units for
presence of lead-579,050; administrative costs--$651,335 ($6.51 per child
tested). Id. at 283-84.
11. "The cost of hazard elimination is high.. . The total cost for a dwelling
unit may vary considerably depending on how much work is done. Washington,
D.C., reports estimated spending of about $300 per dwelling unit, while Chicago
costs run as high as $2,000 a unit." Statement of Harold Finger, 1972 Hearings
19-20. Methods of removing or coveringlead paint are listed in Control of
Lead Poisoning in Children, at VII-11 to VII-16, reproduced in 1970 Hearings
at 157-62.
12. Dr. Jonathan Fine predicted that "a successful national program . . .
placing heavy emphasis on effective treatment of high-risk children and eradica-
tion of lead-based paint surfaces in their homes would cost roughly $100 million
per year for the first two or three years." Statement of Dr. Jonathan Fine, 1970
Hearings 236. Another official estimated that 7,000,000 units presently con-
stitute lead hazards and further estimated a potential cost per unit ranging from$300 to $2,000 to eliminate the hazard; his calculations, therefore, projected a
total cost of $2 billion to $14 billion to rectify the problem. Statement of Harold
Finger, 1972 Hearings 20.
13. See, e.g., St. Louis, Missouri, Ordinance 56091, January 27, 1972. See
altso ordinances reproduced in 1970 Hearings at 310-20. HEW has prepared both
a list of provisions which may be included in a lead paint ordinance and a
model ordinance, Control of Lead Poisoning in Children, at V-9 to V-28, re-
produced in 1970 Hearings at 115-34.
14. For a discussion of the steps in one large city's code enforcement program
see Moses, The Enforcement Process-Housing Codes, 3 URBAN LAw. 559 (1970).
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The conservation effort advances the community's welfare by both
preserving its standard of living and avoiding the economic costs of
unchecked deterioration.1 5
A number of problems arise in attempting to enforce a municipal
ordinance such as one dealing with lead paint. Some enactments are
in the nature of reform movements, aimed at alleviating a particular
problem. Unfortunately, passage of such legislation may be erro-
neously equated with resolution of the problem, resulting in a loss of
momentum toward developing an effective solution.16
The two fundamental means of detecting a code violation are
tenant-initiated complaints and periodic survey inspections by the
municipality. Voluntary reporting by occupants is less expensive but
perhaps not as satisfactory since occupants may refuse to disclose
violations of which they are aware. Reporting an infraction may be
against the tenant's self-interest due to the possibility of retaliatory
eviction, condemnation of the building,17 or rent increases.18
Alternatively, the city may implement an inspection program
which may be both costly and administratively problematic. For in-
stance, the same occupant who refuses to report his building's viola-
tions may deny a city inspector access to his unit.19 Owners may also
obstruct enforcement when the code is too strict and compliance
15. One author has written:
Federal subsidy is available to help do the job of clearing the worst of the
slums; but costs would be reduced and the federal dollar could go further
if marginal areas were upgraded through the use of lesser measures ...
Countless millions of renewal dollars might be saved in the long run.
The new emphasis on housing codes is thus in part a tool for a kind of cut-
rate urban renewal.
L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 50 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as FRIEDMAN].
16. FRIEDMAN 44; G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 180 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as STERNLIEB].
17. See generally St. Louis, Missouri, Ordinance 56091 § 10(C) (1), January
27, 1972.
18. "Since the landlord is a businessman and since the system does not con-
template that he be anything but a businessman, he must . . . shift all or a part
of the cost [of code compliance] to his consumers." FRIEDMAN 196. "Not in-
frequently, code enforcement, where successful, results in an upgrading of build-
ing standards and with it, an increase in rents. This in turn may cause, inadvert-
ently, the very thing which code enforcement strives to do away with, the lessen-
ing of standards as tenants double up to pay increased rents." STERNLIEB 180,
citing W. NASH, RESIDENTIAL IEHABILITATION 113-14 (1959).
19. See Note, The Law of Administrative Inspections: Are Camara and See
Still Alive and Well? 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 313 (1972).
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would require large expenditures; they may induce variable enforce-
ment by "purchasing" compliance reports with payments to corrupt
inspectors.2 0
When a code provision reaches the stage of active implementation,
a basic decision must be made; whether there should be strict en-
forcement (in which some occupants may be compelled to vacate
condemned or abandoned substandard housing and seek shelter in
a tighter market) or loose administration (which may maintain the
housing market but involves the occupancy of perhaps unsafe and
unsanitary units).
Owners' responses to a municipal program are affected by the sub-
stance of the code, the location of their holdings, tax considerations,
and their overall profit picture. Landlords are hesitant to improve in
hard-core slum areas, operating under the principle that it is essential
"not to improve a parcel beyond the value of limitations implicit in
the area itself."21 Owners are reticent to invest when a neighbor-
hood's property values are reduced as buildings age and the area's
socio-economic status declines.22 Moreover, if the cost of improve-
ments is passed on to the tenants by increased rents, the owner may
have difficulty finding occupants in such an area, or he may not be
able to make improvements and increase rents for fear that his pres-
ent tenants would vacate.23
Improvement is also inhibited by taxes, the largest single operat-
ing expense of inner-city slum housing.24 "In the face of rent level
plateaus, the increasing level of the tax rate [caused by greater de-
mand for services and a static tax base] . . . has reduced the profita-
bility of slum investment. The typical landlord response has been to
reduce maintenance and avoid additional investment."25 Although
20. FRDmAN 41.
21. STERNLEB 155.
22. "The market situation in the areas of the older city which are under con-
sideration has degenerated to the point of reaching a dynamic spiral: lack of
maintenance leads to poorer rent rolls, poorer rent rolls lead to lack of mainten-
ance." Id. at 223.
23. Id. at 93. With increasing vacancy rates in the slums, the reaction of the
typical landlord with extensive holdings has been "to reduce maintenance ex-
penditures rather than to reduce rents, with a minority making improvements to
secure tenantry.... The weak resale and finance markets definitely inhibit re-
habilitation efforts." Id. at xix.
24. Id. at xx. See generally id. at 203-24.
25. Id. at 214 (emphasis deleted).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
removing the lead hazard from a dwelling unit may not be an assess-
able improvement, general tax pressures on the owner may affect his
investment scheme so as to preclude voluntary repair expenditures.
Some owners, such as new residential landlords, may simply be
unable to pay for improvements in their buildings. When a high
finance charge is imposed for the initial acquisition of property, little
cash for improvements may remain.2 Even if long-term financing were
available for improvements, many owners might still refrain due to
either a judgment that the building is not worthy of investment, or
a fear of going into debt.27
The owner's reluctance to improve, therefore, may be interpreted
as an economic decision based on market factors. A high rate of cur-
rent return is required in order to consider further investment in a
building due to "a compound.., fear of costly code crackdowns; the
basic weakness of the market, both in terms of rental increases and
securing full tenancy; the risk of outright loss through the complete
abandonment of a parcel; and in substantial part, the pejoratives
which society heaps upon the 'slum lord.' ,S
The foundation of the concept that slum landlords are unscrupu-
lous profiteers has been challenged with the observation that "invest-
ors must be attracted by high returns into occupations of great risk
and small prestige."29 Under this view, the owner of an unprofitable
building containing code violations is simply being pragmatic when
he makes only minimal repairs for compliance. The alternatives
facing an investor if he does not consider his return to be adequate
26. Id. at 118-19.
27. Id. at 196-201.
28. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis deleted).
29. FRIEDMrAN 41.
A belief that landlords were greedy villains was a necessity for the housing
reformers. Since reform laws imposed costs on landlords without reimbursing
them in any way, and since no one expected or wanted rents to rise, it was
morally necessary to believe that rents were exorbitant and that costs could
be absorbed without giving up a fair return. It was convenient, therefore,
to assume that landlords were a class of evil men, overcharging ignorant
tenants and callous to the point of criminality.... [N]othing impeded the
progress of the notion that slum money was tainted money; and belief in
the evils of slum ownership became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Bad reputation
is a cost to a man, even if it cannot be measured exactly and valued in
dollars ....
Id. at 40, 41.
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are continuing operation in violation of the code,30 allowing the
city to make the necessary repairs,31 or abandonment.
The actual profitability of slum property, in which code violations
are frequent, is a disputed topic. A 1969 New York City study indi-
cated that the percentage of gross income allocated to repairs and
painting and the net operating income is similar for both good-
condition/well-maintained and poor-condition/poorly-maintained ten-
ements.32 Other authorities reveal that net income as a percentage
of gross income has declined while costs have increased. 3 3 Professor
Sternlieb concluded in The Tenement Landlord that the actual re-
turn on investment for the properties he studied in Newark, New
Jersey, was ten to twelve per cent. 34 Another author, however, has
criticized findings such as Sternlieb's as being too limited in scope to
be conclusive and suggests that "it would be a great mistake to re-
spond to a single study by replacing the stereotype of popular fable
["slumlord" as profiteer] with a stereotype derived from the study."3 5
Whether the owners of substandard housing are profiteering is one
factor to be considered in the question of how code compliance can
be achieved when owners initially refuse to repair. Among the legal
methods which code enforcement agencies may be authorized to use
are criminal sanctions, equitable remedies, and various other sup-
plemental devices.
Criminal prosecution is the foremost method of enforcing munic-
ipal codes, with fines being used to deter infractions and induce re-
pairs." The criminal approach, however, has frequently been crit-
30. The economic "impossibility" of repair for a landlord has been held to
preclude conviction for code non-compliance, Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code
Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1254, 1270-72 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Gribetz & Grad]. See also Comment, Nonprofitability as a
Defense for Noncompliance with Minimum Housing Codes, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q.
374 (1972).
31. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
32. C. RAPxIN, THE REAL ESTATE MARKET IN AN URBAN RENEWAL AREA 72
(1959), quoted in STERNLIEB 77.
33. STERNLIEB 79, citing Exchange of Rental Income and Operating Ex-
pense Data, J. PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 7 (1964).
34. STERNLIEB 88.
35. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor, 80
YALE L.J. 1093, 1099-1100 & n.8 (1971).
36. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 lHi-v. L. REv. 801,
820 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes]. The
use of jail sentences is generally limited to coercing the payment of fines. Id. at
824-25.
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icized37 Imposing a fine on an owner of substandard housing is diffi-
cult because it must be large enough to be considered more than a
negligible cost of business, yet small enough to leave capital for the
needed repairs. 38 Many owners may be willing to risk apprehension
when poorly-funded enforcement efforts result in few prosecutions
or when the cost of compliance is significantly greater than the
amount of the probable fine.
A variation of the criminal fine, a fixed per diem civil penalty for
each day a violation persists, would encourage rapid repair to avoid
a large total fine. This would discourage violations by the landlords
who consider a fixed criminal fine minimal in comparison to the cost
of the needed repairs3 9 Yet, because the proposal would appear not
to increase the number of violators apprehended and subjected to
penalty, many would continue to risk prosecution. Further, a manda-
tory fine would eliminate the theoretically important function of
judicial discretion in fitting the sanction to the code violator.
The equitable remedies of injunction and receivership are effec-
tive, when used, but involve large commitments from the enforce-
ment agencies. An injunction may require the owner to repair or
cease operating his building, with equity providing needed super-
vision of the compliance effort and contempt sanctions being avail-
able.40 Receiverships are utilized when basically sound buildings are
not repaired; the court-appointed receiver makes repairs and manages
the building until the amount of rent collected equals the cost of
repair.41 It may be difficult to find a private citizen willing to be a
receiver, however, and administrative problems arise when the city
functions in that capacity.42 Although injunctions and receiverships
involve substantial enforcement efforts, considering the hazardous
nature of the lead poisoning problem, their use can be desirable.
A direct municipal emergency repair program is a final alternative
when an owner does not repair and immediate work is necessary for
37. See generally FRIMAAN 194-97; F. GaAD, J. HACx, & J. MaAvoy, Housing
Codes and Their Enforcement 90-98 (1966); Gribetz & Grad 1275-81; Enforce-
ment of Municipal Housing Codes 820-24.
38. Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes 820.
39. Gribetz & Grad 1281-90.
40. Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes 827.
41. FRmDAN 65; Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes 828.
42. FRIDMAN 67-68; Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes 828-30.
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the welfare of occupants.4 Since the cost of a city repair service would
be high,4 4 it might be limited to immediate necessities such as heat,
hot water, electricity, and pest extermination." Lead paint is a
dangerous condition, but its incidence and cost of rectification could
remove it from a city repair program due to budgetary limitations
and a judgment by city officials that other items should have priority.
"When the apartment market is very strong the landlord need not
improve; when the apartment market is very weak the landlord fears
for his investment and does not improve. What can municipal auth-
orities use to break this impasse?" 46 When one considers the unwill-
ingness of many owners to repair, the inefficacy of criminal sanctions,
and fiscal limitations on city governments, the prospect of solving
the lead poisoning problem is poor. It has been suggested that the
frustrations of a code enforcement program lead to "a tendency to
negotiate the tenant's rights away with the hope that sooner or later
an adequately financed rent-subsidy or public-housing program will
eliminate the slums. In consequence, a vicious circle of non-action is
created."47
Rent subsidy is a possible solution to the expensive problem of
code enforcement. Assuming punishment to have been unsuccessful
in achieving compliance, commentators have suggested that the gov-
ernment should subsidize slum dwellers or landlords in order to
make it profitable to operate substandard housing at code level.4 A
supplement to the money an occupant has available for housing
would enable him to pay the increased rent which the owner would
charge for improving the building. To implement the suggestion,
surely a skeptical public and legislature would have to be fully con-
vinced that slum landlords are not profiting inordinately from their
investments. Even the skeptic, though, might agree that a subsidy
which retains present housing would be less costly than financing
the public housing which would probably be necessary if private
investors were to abandon the low-income housing market.
43. See generally F. GRAD, J. HACx & J. McAvoy, supra note 37, at 105-08;
Gribetz & Grad 1274-75.
44. Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes 835-36 & nn.182-86.
45. M. LIPSKY, PROTEST IN CITY PoLITICS 86-96 (1970).
46. STERNLIEB 226.
47. SAX & HmSTA\D, SlumlordLsm as a Tort, 65 MiC. L. REv. 869, 874
(1967).
48. FRIEDMAN 196-99; STERNLIEB 234.
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I. STATE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONS
The existence of a landlord's obligation to keep his tenants'
premises free of lead paint hazards may be derived from specific state
legislative enactments, more general statutory duties, or judicial in-
terpretations of the common law. Three states have passed statutes
aimed directly at the problem, imposing a duty not to apply lead
paint to the interior surfaces of a dwelling.49 When such paint has
already been applied and is allowed to peel-creating a lead hazard-
the situation may be within the broader legislation of several states
which establish a landlord's duty to repair.5° Related to legislative
action is the judicial expansion of the doctrine of implied warranty
of habitability in landlord-tenant relations.5'
A few jurisdictions provide by statute-2 or judicial decision 3 that
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43 § 117A (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
111, §§ 190-99 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 206(l)(n),
608(1) (g), 1370-76 (McKinney 1955). See also municipal ordinances cited and
referred to in note 13 supra.
50. CAL. Crv. CODE ANN. § 1941 (West 1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. RnV. §
19-343 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111 to 112 (1955); IOWA CODE ANN. §
413.66 (1949); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2692-93 (West 1954); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 144, § 66 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2843 (1973); MONT. REy.
CODES ANN. § 42-201 (1947); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKINNEY
1946); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-12 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 31
(1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25025 (1957); S.D. COMPILED LAWS § 43-32-8
(1967). The statutes are discussed in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 346-49
(A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
51. See generally Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights:
Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 489 (1971); Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied War-
ranty of Habitability--Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20
DEPAUL L. REv. 955 (1971); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An
Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant? 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 123
(1971); Annot. 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971).
52. CAL. CiV. CODE ANN. § 1942 (West 1954); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2694 (West 1954); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 42-202 (1947); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-16-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 32 (1954); S.D. Cola-
PILED LAWS § 43-32-9 (1967).
53. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (the cost of "vital re-
pairs" may be deducted from rent due to the landlord's implied duty to main-
tain the dwelling in an habitable condition); Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d
468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971); Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63
Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970) (based on New York's
repair statute, the court concluded that the tenant may make emergency repairs
to abate a lead hazard and may recover the reasonable cost of materials and
the minimum wage for labor expended). See also Comment, Landlord-Tenant-
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a tenant in some circumstances may repair certain defects in his
dwelling and deduct the cost incurred from his rental payment.
"Repair and deduct" may be of limited utility, however, since the
amount of repair which may be offset against rent may be limited,54
preventing extensive repair efforts. Also, the tenant may have waived
recourse to such activity by a lease provision. In addition, the possi-
bility of eviction for a self-help tenant is great when his landlord's
rental income is depleted by repairs, whether or not the repairs are
justified.
Statutes in at least two states permit rent abatement, suspending
the tenant's obligation to pay rent until the landlord repairs. 55 Other
provisions permit rent withholding,50 in which a court collects and
holds the tenants' rent until repairs are made. Unauthorized with-
holdings-rent strikes-seek the same result, but may involve tenant
eviction for nonpayment of rent.67
Landlord Liability for Tenant Self-Help--To Paint or Not To Paint: Garcia's
Dilemma. 20 DEPAUL L. REv. 544 (1971).
The Rivera court summarized the circumstances when a New York tenant
may repair his premises and deduct the repair costs from his rent as being when:
"(1) the condition in question creates an emergency seriously affecting the habit-
ability of the home, (2) the landlord has refused to make the repairs, and (3)
the condition cannot reasonably be permitted to continue until code enforcement
proceedings have run their course." Jackson v. Rivera, supra at 471, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 10.
54. CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1942 (West 1954) and MONT. REv. CODEs ANN.
42-202 (1947) permit repairs only in the amount of one month's rent per year.
55, MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1972); N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
L&w § 302-a (McKinney Supp. 1972).
56. MASs. GEN. LAWs AN,,. ch. 111, § 127F (1967); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTio-Ws LAW §§ 755 (McKinney 1963), 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1972); PA.
SrAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24.2-11
(1970). Professor Friedman suggests caution in a withholding program:
fA) genuine withholding program can only work, that is, result in code
compliance, for buildings which can be salvaged-not for the worst, but for
the borderline cases. Rent withholding does prod some landlords into mak-
ing improvements. The difficulty is to know when this is the normal result
of pressure. In other cases rent withholding simply tips the scale toward
demolition, thus decreasing the housing supply without corresponding gains
for the tenants.
FRIEDMAN 63.
57. See Fishman, St. Louis Rent Strike, 28 NAT'L LEGAL Am DEFENDERS
ASS'N Ill (1970); Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substand-
ard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304 (1965); Note, Right to Deposit Rent Pay-
ments in Escrow Fund in Protest of Housing Code Violations, 1970 Wis. L.
REv. 607.
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If peeling lead paint is ignored and lead poisoning of a child
occurs, the injured party may advocate several theories to obtain
compensation.58 A traditional tort action against a landlord for neg-
ligence in allowing a lead hazard to exist has been both approved
and rejected by the courts. In Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp.,5 9 a
lower New York court held a landlord responsible for hospital costs
and damages to a child poisoned by lead paint, basing liability on
the state's statutory landlord duty to repairG0 and the common
knowledge that small children engage in oral exploration of acces-
sible objects.61 The poisoning was declared to have been foreseeable
under the circumstances, thus recovery was found appropriate.02
Other cases, denying recovery, indicate that for a plaintiff to recover
for lead paint poisoning, he must establish that the landlord had a
duty to eliminate such paint and failed to do so, or that the landlord
had or should have had actual knowledge that lead paint is a haz-
ardous substance and existed in the premises. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held in Kolojeski v. John Deisher, Inc.63 that the death
of a child allegedly from lead paint ingestion was not actionable
negligence in that particular situation: "'[We take judicial notice
that the use of such paint is common and widespread.' "04 The court
did state that the landlord would be liable to the tenant if the use
of lead paint created a dangerous condition of which the landlord,
but not the tenant, had knowledge.05
In another lead poisoning case, Montgomery v. Cantellip6 a Louisi-
ana court of appeal found that the landlord "could not have reason-
ably foreseen that a child would pick paint flakes from the door
and eat them."67 A later Louisiana appellate court case, Davis v.
58. See generally Moskovitz & Bales, A New Threat-Lead Poisoning of
Slum Children, 3 CLEARNGHOUSE Rav. 92 (1969); Note, Lead Paint Poison.
ing: Legal Remedies and Preventive Actions, 6 COLU.. J.L. & SoC. PRoBs. 325,
327-32 (1970).
59. 38 Misc. 2d 859, 238 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
60. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 78 (McKinney 1946).
61. 38 Misc. 2d at 860, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
62. Id. at 860, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 714-15.
63. 429 Pa. 191, 239 A.2d 329 (1968).
64. Id. at 195, 239 A.2d at 331.
65. Id.
66. 174 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
67. Id. at 240. On the eating of paint, the court went on to say: "Such gas-
tronomic culinary impulses are, to say the least, abnormal and unexpected, and
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Royal-Globe Insurance Cos.,68 permitted the awarding of a $115,000
jury verdict for the landlord's negligence which resulted in a child's
lead poisoning, retardation, and institutionalization; but the State
supreme court reversed the lower court, asserting that the jury's
finding was a manifestly erroneous fact determination on several
grounds. 69
The Pennsylvania and Louisiana cases which denied recovery for
alleged lead poisoning due to a lack of landlord negligence were de-
cided between 1965 and 1970. Since that time, public (and landlord)
awareness of the lead paint problem has increased due to concerned
citizen groups and specific legislation at all levels of government.
What is "reasonably foreseeable" is an evolving concept; it is more
likely today that a plaintiff could succeed in a negligence suit against
his landlord for lead paint poisoning. Two theories have recently
been suggested for a plaintiff's recovery for defects in a dwelling: strict
liabilityr ° and the tort of "slumlordism."' 1
IlI. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The federal government has recognized the lead poisoning problem
and has attempted to deal with it through the Lead-Based Paint
Poisoning Prevention Act of 1970.72 The Act generally provided for
federal grants to units of general local government for health and
could not reasonably be anticipated by the lessor. Therefore, we are led to the
inevitable conclusion that the defendant is not liable for the very unusual injury
incurred by the plaintiff's child." Id. at 240-41.
68. 223 So. 2d 912 (Ct. App. La. 1969).
69. Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Cos., 257 La. 523, 242 So. 2d 839 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
70. See Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 458 (1970).
71. See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 47.
The authors' proposed rule is:
[Olne who undertakes to perform a service for his own economic benefit,but who performs it in a way both inconsistent with those standards which
represent minimum social goals as to decent treatment and in a manner that
itself is violative of the law, under circumstances where the victim had no
meaningful alternative but to deal with him, commits a tort for which sub-
stantial damages ought to lie.... [lf [landlords] undertake to provide services
for their own economic benefit, they must serve adequately or be deemed
wrongdoers in law.
Id. at 890-91.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801-43 (1970). Federal legislation has also dealt with code
enforcement efforts, a category within which lead paint poisoning has been in-
cluded. See generally Greenstein, Federally Assisted Code Enforcement: Prob-
lems and Approaches, 3 URBAN LAw. 629 (1971).
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housing programs, a federal study of the problem, and a prohibition
of the use of lead paint in certain structures.
Grants by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) were authorized to the extent of 75% of the cost of develop-
ing and carrying out programs "to detect and treat incidents of
lead-based paint poisoning."7 3 The programs include informational
efforts, development and implementation of screening methods to
detect lead poisoning, medical treatment, follow-up programs, and
other actions to eliminate the hazard.7 4 HEW was also authorized to
fund local efforts to identify areas of lead poisoning risk and to then
eliminate the hazard.75
The health and housing programs were to be conducted consist-
ent with each other, and were to employ residents of the areas in-
volved to the extent feasible.76 Further, a study by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in consultation with
HEW, was directed "to determine the nature and extent of the prob-
lem of lead-based paint poisoning . . . and the methods by which
lead-based paint can most effectively be removed . ... " IHEW also
was directed to "prohibit the use of lead-based paint in residential
structures constructed or rehabilitated after January 13, 1971, by the
federal government, or with federal assistance in any form.7 8
The Act authorized appropriation of $10,000,000 in 1971 and
$20,000,000 in 1972 to carry out its provisions. 1 An initial sponsor
of the Act, New York Congressman William Ryan charged, however,
that despite the authorizations "[t]he Nixon administration stead-
fastly refused to request a single penny to fund it for fiscal year 1971
and only after great public pressure did it finally submit a belated
amended budget request for a mere $2 million for fiscal year 1972."S0
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4801(a), (b) (1970).
74. Id. § 4801 (c).
75. Id. § 4811 (a). HEW regulations governing grants authorized by §§ 4801
and 4811 are published at 37 Fed. Reg. 9188 (1972).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801(d), 4811(b)(1)-(2) (1970).
77. Id. § 4821.
78. Id. § 4831. HUD regulations are published at 37 Fed. Reg. 16,872, 23,732
(1972). See also City-Wide Coalition Against Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning
v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 2 CCH PovERY L. REP. 16,864 (E.D.
Pa. May 12, 1973).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 4843 (1970).
80. Statement of Congressman William Ryan, 1972 Hearings 118.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/11
LEAD PAINT POISONING
Congress in fact appropriated $7,500,000 for that year.81 The 1973
Administration budget called for $9,500,000 specifically under the
Act,,: but the lead poisoning prevention effort by the federal gov-
ernment has thereafter been funded by other authorizations.83
It was apparent in the 1970 Senate hearings on the proposed Act
that a fundamental difference as to funding existed between Ad-
ministration officials and proponents of the Act. The sponsors favored
and focused specifically upon a categorical approach to the problem
of lead paint poisoning. 8 The Administration contended that a
broader approach was more appropriate-3 and that federal authorities
already existed in 1970 to conduct the activities envisioned in the
Act.,
The urgency of a situation in which children are being poisoned
calls for a specific approach, but such an approach could involve
both a delay in implementation (due to the time necessary to estab-
lish administrative machinery) and a costly duplication of functions
performed by existing agencies. The broader approach, proceeding
through established channels, could minimize administrative costs,
81. Statement of Senator Edward Kennedy, 1972 Hearings 237; Statement of
Congressman William Ryan, 1972 Hearings 118. A HEW official testified in 1972
concerning the ways in which the $7,500,000 appropriated by Congress was going
to be spent. Statement of Dr. Merlin DuVal, 1972 Hearings 237-49.
82. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1973, at 399 (1971). See also OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUD-
GT, SPECIAL ANALYSES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMEINT FISCAL YEAR 1973
(1972): "In 1973, $9.5 million in grants will be awarded to about 50 com-
munities to screen approximately 1.5 million children at risk of having or ac-
quiring lead poisoning and to support the development of community organiza-
tin and public education to prevent future lead poisoning." Id. at 171.
33. OFFICE OF N'kNAGENIMNT AND BUDGET, APPENDLX TO THE BUDGET FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 386-87 (1972). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 246(e), 247 (1970).
84. Statement of Senator Richard Schweiker, 1970 Hearings 190-91. See also
dialo gue between Senator Edward Kennedy, Dr. Merlin DuVal, and Mr. Robert
Novick, 1972 Hearings 238-40.
85. "It has occurred in the past that over emphasis sometimes on the categor-
ical approach may leave other problems that may be equally or even more press-
ing .... wanting for attention, because of the focus upon what is categorically
attacked." Statement of Dr. John Hanlon, 1970 Hearings 190.
86. "These Federal authorities are those included in section 314 of the Public
Health Service Act and in Title V of the Social Security Act." Statement of Dr.
John Hanlon, 1970 Hearings 183. See also Control of Lead Poisoning in Chil-
dren, supra note 2, Part VI, Table 1, listing agencies and programs which may
be 'ources for funding of a lead poisoning prevention effort; reproduced in 1970
Hearings at 137-46.
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but would result in intragovernmental jurisdictional problems 7 and
perhaps a decreased emphasis on the severity of the specific hazard.
Funding authorized by the 1970 Act expired at the end of fiscal
year 1972,88 prompting the introduction of an amendment to the
Act. 8 The Administration opposed the categorical approach of the
amendment because it ran "counter to the constructive efforts of the
Administration to simplify and consolidate Federal health grant pro-
grams and to encourage States and localities to meeet their own indi-
vidual requirements." 90 An Administration official suggested that the
federal government's role was to fund child-screening projects and to
develop community organization and education for minimizing future
lead poisoning problems, while the local role was to deal with hous-
ing by such means as building codes.01 A slightly altered amendment92
passed the Senate notwithstanding attack by the Administration, but
the amendment died in a House committee when the session ended.0a
The Senate, however, resurrected the issue in 1973. Within one
87. The Act provided for health and housing programs to be conducted by
HEW, both HEW and HUD were to study the lead paint poisoning problem,
and HEW alone was charged with prohibiting the use of lead paint in certain
federal construction and rehabilitation projects. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801-31 (1970).
During consideration of the statute, however, one city health official had recom-
mended that funding be through one federal body; when more than one is in-
volved, he stated that there are often "different sets of guidelines, resulting in a
great deal of confusion within the city, lack of coordination in implementation,
and much delay that comes about . . ." Statement of Dr. Jonathan Fine, 1970
Hearings 236.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4843(a)-(c) (1970). Amounts appropriated under the Act
but not expended remained available. Id. § 4843 (d).
89. S. 3080, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9406-14 (1972). Provisions of the amend-
ment included: (1) an increase in the federal share of funding for a local pro-
gram from 75% to 90%; (2) an expansion of the definition of "lead-based
paint" to encompass paint with 0.5% and eventually 0.069o lead content, rather
than the 1% content permited by the 1970 Act; (3) a yearly total authorization
of $100,000,000, as compared to the 1970 Act's annual authorizations of
$10,000,000 and $20,000,000 in 1971 and 1972, respectively; (4) the establish-
ment of a National Childhood Lead Based Paint Poisoning Advisory Board to
advise HEW on the administration of the Act, with two-thirds of the members
of the Board being residents of areas affected by lead-based paint poisoning; (5)
an exclusion of the lead-based paint poisoning problem from the scope of the
Public Health Service Act § 314(e). 1972 Hearings 408-13.
90. Statement of Dr. Merlin DuVal, 1972 Hearings 259.
91. Id. at 258.
92. 118 CONG. REc. S9406-14 (daily ed. June 14, 1972).
93. CCH 1971-72 CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 2541.
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week an amendment to the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention
Act passed both houses of Congress. 94 The 1973 amendment incorp-
orates most of the elements of the previous Senate amendment,
namely: (1) an increase of federal funding from 75% to 90% of the
cost of local programs; (2) an expansion of the definition of "lead-
based paint" from 1% lead content to 0.5% and, after December 31,
1973, 0.06%; (3) exclusion of the lead-based paint poisoning prob-
lem from the scope of the Public Health Service Act; and (4) the
creation of a National Childhood Lead Based Paint Poisoning Board
to advise HEW.9 5 The new law goes further than the previous Senate
amendment by directing the Secretary of HEW to prohibit use of
lead-based paint in residential structures receiving federal assistance
or on "any toy, furniture, cooking utensil, drinking utensil or eating
utensil." 96 The Act appropriates $63,000,000 a year for two years with
$25,000,000 for detection and treatment of lead poisoning, $35,000,000
for elimination of the poisoning and $3,000,000 for research.9 7
The extent of the Administration's defeat in this area is expressed
by the strong approach of the new Act. Whereas the 1970 Act had
granted the funds appropriated thereunder to local government
units,9 8 the new amendment grants said funds only to "public agencies
of units of local government."9 9 In dealing with the lead-based paint
poisoning problem, the specific categorical approach of federal fund-
ing at the local level is the method that has been adopted.
CONCLUSION
"Lead paint poisoning costs this Nation about $200 million an-
nually. This estimate includes the lost earnings and the costs of
treatment, education, and institutional care of those afflicted. In
addition, there is an unquantified cost to society of approximately
200 deaths per year traceable to lead poisoning. ' 00
The existence today of widespread lead paint poisoning in the
United States is a striking example of the problems of societal alloca-
94. S. 607, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
95. Id. §§ 1(b), 6, 7(e), 8.
96. Id. § 5. The prohibition of the use of lead-based paint in residential struc-
tures receiving federal assistance was also contained in the 1970 Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4831 (1970).
97. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1973, § A, at 5, col. 7.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801 (a), 4811 (1970).
99. S. 607, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1(a), 2(a) (1973).
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tion of resources; the health of thousands of children is one of many
interests competing for funding from limited governmental sources.
The burden of eliminating the lead paint hazard may, of course, be
placed on the private investors and landlords who operate the affected
housing units. As this Note has suggested, to hold such parties re-
sponsible for the costly process of removing lead paint which exists
in their premises could result in owners' abandonment of existing
property, discouragement of future investments, or an increase in
rent beyond tenants' means. That course may be advocated by some
with the expectation that in the absence of private housing, public
facilities would, of necessity, be constructed. 1° 1
Even without affirmative action the lead paint problem could
diminish eventually. Those units presently containing lead paint
will eventually deteriorate to the point of being demolished, and if
lead paint will no longer be utilized in construction and mainten-
ance of dwellings, there would be no hazardous paint source from
which a child could be poisoned. The new federal Act by prohibiting
lead-based paint use furthers this future solution.
The resource allocation decision as to lead poisoning will be made
by voters and legislatures throughout the United States. The crucial
period is between today-when the problem can be solved through a
massive effort-and that future date when the housing cycle reaches
the point where residences containing lead dangers no longer exist.
In the balance are the lives and health of thousands of children who
will be exposed to dangerous levels of lead paint during the coming
years.
100. Statement of Dr. Merlin DuVal, 1972 Hearings 235-36.
101. See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 71.
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